. Nevertheless, a significant problem remains.
The most familiar accounts of how deconstruction works are not consistent with the idea of rectification or amelioration. As I shall now show, each of these accounts proves unacceptable for a critical approach to law.
One view would contend that deconstruction reverses a hierarchy between conceptual opposites, so that the subordinate term is now more important than the superordinate term. However, this will simply lead to an opposite falsification and simplification of the situation. In Derrida's terms, it would simply reestablish the error of logocentrism in a different way; hence in Positions he rejects this interpretation of the deconstruction of the opposition between speech and writing (1981a: 41-2) .
A second possibility would be that deconstruction seeks to efface the distinction between the two terms of a conceptual opposition. However, this raises significant problems of its own. We cannot efface the distinction between speech and writing because they are not in fact identical in all respects. Even after our deconstruction, speech is still spoken and writing is still written. Thus, we can only claim that we have effaced the distinction between them if we maintain that the differences between them are unimportant to their true nature. An essential property of speech and writing is their semiotic function; an accidental or inessential property is the fact that they are produced by a voice or with a pencil. However, this commits Derrida to a distinction between essential and inessential properties, a distinction he would be unlikely to adopt. Moreover, it creates a severe irony: we can only justify the effacement of distinctions by asserting the essential character of other properties and distinguishing them from accidental properties. Thus, we efface one distinction only to assert another, necessary one (see Seung, 1994 (Balkin, 1990b (Derrida, 1985 (Derrida, , 1989 Balkin, 1990a Balkin, , 1994 . This is hardly surprising, once we understand deconstructive argument as a form of rhetoric.
The charge levelled against rhetoric has always been that, because it can serve both good and bad purposes, it can be used to mislead people, to induce evil courses of action, or to justify wicked things. Nevertheless (Derrida, 1990: 947-9 Because deconstruction is justice, and because justice is impossible, deconstruction is impossible. However, the undeconstructibility of justice and the deconstructibility of law make deconstruction possible. Hence deconstruction is both possible and impossible.
